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Monetary policy and the measurement of inflation: 
prices, wages and expectations 
Stephen G Cecchetti
1 
Inflation measurement is fundamental to the conduct of monetary policy. Price indices form 
the foundation of central bank policy frameworks around the world. They serve as guides to 
decision-making, as well as providing the primary mechanism for holding independent 
policymakers accountable. The purpose of the annual meeting of Deputy Governors of 
emerging market economies, held in Basel on 5–6 February 2009, was to explore three 
issues: price indices used by central banks; the role of wages and productivity in inflation 
policy; and the measurement and assessment of inflation expectations. In this brief 
introductory essay, I will introduce each of these topics. 
Price indices used by central banks 
Over the last quarter of the 20th century, a consensus developed that price stability should 
be the primary focus of monetary policy. It is now agreed that the economic well-being of the 
general population is best served by keeping inflation low and stable and that, in order to 
deliver on this objective, central banks should be independent of political authorities, but 
receive a clear mandate for which they are then held accountable.
2 
Day-to-day implementation of a price stability mandate, as well as accountability, has to be 
based on data. This means choosing a price index. And, as everyone knows, there are a 
variety of indices available. National statistical offices in most countries produce survey-
based consumer price indices as well as indices used in the construction of national income 
and product account measures. These indices differ based on their coverage and their 
weighting. For example, consumer price indices generally cover out-of-pocket expenditures 
with fixed weights based on survey responses, while personal consumption expenditure price 
indices may be implicit deflators, with weights that change every period and cover both 
actual expenditure and services provided by governments, or imputations for other goods 
that are not explicitly priced.  
Before going into the details of the problems facing central banks, it is worth reflecting on the 
broad reasons one might wish to measure prices. There are three. The first is to transform 
nominal quantities into real quantities. This is the role of implicit deflators and chained indices 
constructed in the process of computing real gross domestic product and its components. 
The second rationale for computing a price index is to compensate individuals for price 
changes in order to keep their utility invariant in the face of aggregate inflation. Consumer 
price indices are computed for this purpose. Third, and last, we compute price indices for the 
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conduct of monetary policy. At the abstract level of macroeconomic modelling, it is simple to 
say that this is the aggregate price level. More concretely we could think of it as the common 
element of all prices in the economy. That is, every price can be decomposed into a common 
and an (orthogonal) idiosyncratic element. The common part is the aggregate price level, and 
this is the part with which monetary policy should be concerned – in theory, that is. Practice 
is harder, and that is where we go next.  
The questionnaire responses in Table A1 of Moreno (2009, this volume)
3 make it clear that 
the primary price indicator or target for the majority of emerging market economies (EMEs) 
represented at the 2009 meeting is headline CPI,
4 often supplemented by a set of other 
indicators. Large structural changes in developing economies can make the accurate 
measurement of inflation a far from trivial exercise. Rapid productivity growth, terms-of-trade 
shocks and divergent price movements across sectors all create challenges for monetary 
policy.  
Beyond the choice of an index to target – a headline measure – central bankers face two 
challenges in measuring inflation for the purpose of short-term policymaking. The first 
concerns transitory phenomena, or noise, that should not affect policymakers’ actions. 
Sources of such noise include changing seasonal patterns, broad-based resource shocks, 
exchange rate changes, changes in indirect taxes, and asynchronous price adjustment. 
Knowledge of the extent to which noise is present in measured aggregate price indices is 
important since it determines the extent to which policymakers should react to monthly or 
quarterly changes in observed aggregate price indices. 
The second potentially severe difficulty associated with measurement involves biases that 
are a consequence of weighting schemes, sampling techniques and quality adjustments 
employed in the calculation of price indices These biases can be divided into two broad 
categories: those related to the way in which individual prices are weighted together to form 
an aggregate index (weighting bias; an example is substitution bias); and those that result 
from actual errors in measuring the individual prices themselves (measurement bias), such 
as quality or new goods bias. 
Underlying or core measures of inflation 
There have been a number of suggested solutions to the problem of high-frequency noise in 
monthly or quarterly inflation measures. The most common is to measure the underlying or 
core component of inflation by excluding certain prices from the computation of the index; 
that is, assign a zero weight to parts of the index believed, a priori, to contain substantial 
amounts of noise (and then proportionally increase the weight on what remains). This is the 
“ex food and energy” strategy that is common in many countries. There are a variety of 
alternative methods of measuring core inflation. These include median and trimmed mean 
measures
5 or more involved econometric procedures.
6 While these alternatives are widely 
employed inside of central banks – most policymakers monitor a suite of indices – complexity 
limits their usefulness in external communication. 
In addition to transparency and simplicity, core measures should exhibit a variety of other 
properties. First, they should be unbiased so that over relatively long periods they exhibit the 
same average inflation as the headline index. Second, their volatility should in fact be lower 
                                                  
3   This paper also provides more detail on some of the measurement issues discussed in this section.  
4   An exception is Thailand, which targets core CPI. 
5   See Bryan et al (1997).  
6   One such example is described in Bryan and Cecchetti (1993).  BIS Papers No 49  3
 
 
than that of the all-items measure. Third, since the core is supposed to devoid of transitory 
fluctuations, the headline measure should revert to it, not the other way around. Related to all 
of these is that the core and headline measures should be cointegrated – that is, their 
difference should be mean zero with no trend (either deterministic or stochastic).  
It is worth noting that some central banks (notably the Bank of Thailand and the National 
Bank of Poland) have put substantial energy into successful education programmes, with the 
result that the public in those countries are comfortable with the relatively complex concept of 
core inflation. However, other central banks have questioned the ability to do this. As one 
central bank meeting participant noted, in his country there is one price index for each 
person. In the end, since everyone eats and uses electricity and fuel, excluding food and 
energy can be quite difficult to explain. And in poor countries, where food is a large fraction 
of expenditure, this can present significant difficulties.
7 Over-reliance on core measures can 
damage the central bank’s credibility. 
Meeting participants highlighted a variety of disadvantages of core measures of inflation. 
First, there is the fact that the exclusion measures (ex food and energy) are built under the 
assumption that the items left out contain no information about the long-run inflation trend. 
That need not be true. For example, commodity price inflation may exhibit substantial 
persistence, and if it does, then core measures will diverge from headline inflation for 
significant periods. In recent years, both Colombia and Thailand have experienced such a 
problem.  
Some participants observed that, in their environment, core measures of inflation were of 
limited usefulness in policy formulation. First, there is the problem of communication: in the 
Philippines, for example, the general public is more familiar with headline inflation (both 
headline and core inflation are available five days after the reference month). Second, on an 
analytical level, the amount of information contained in core measures, over and above what 
is in headline inflation, varies.. In Brazil, for example, measures of core inflation have not 
been useful in forecasting the trend in headline inflation. And in the Philippines, the 
correlation between headline and core CPI inflation is 0.91, and tests of mean and variance 
show no advantage in the measure of core inflation. However, in periods of volatile 
commodity and energy prices, the use of core inflation would be an important indicator for 
decision-making, especially if central banks are concerned about the second-round effects of 
these volatile commodity prices on inflation. 
Beyond the potential usefulness of core measures for decision-making and communication, 
there is the question of whether a central bank should target core or headline inflation. As 
headline inflation is the measure of the cost of living, and this is what affects welfare, most 
central banks target headline inflation, using core as a supplementary indicator primarily for 
internal use. But one central bank, the Bank of Thailand, has taken a different route, 
targeting core inflation. 
There is ample theoretical justification for the Thai decision. In state-of-the-art 
macroeconomic models, price rigidity is why monetary policy has real effects.
8 It is these 
sticky prices that cause output and unemployment to fluctuate away from their optimal levels. 
Policymakers should therefore only concern themselves with the fluctuations in activity 
associated with these particular price (and wage) movements. Flexible prices – those of 
items like food and oil that are determined in markets and change every day (or minute) – 
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are of no consequence. In fact, in the benchmark New Keynesian model, when inflation is 
stable, output is equal to potential, so there is no output gap. But in the end, this is an 
empirical question that needs to be answered on a case by case basis: does stabilising core 
inflation lead to a more stable economy or not?
9 
Measurement bias, administered prices and coverage 
Understanding short-run fluctuations in price measures is only one of the problems 
policymakers face. Their lives are made even more difficult by the fact that traditional price 
indices are biased upward. The sense in which they are biased is somewhat difficult to 
describe, but quite precise: if you use standard price measures like the CPI to increase the 
nominal wage of the typical household in an attempt to keep their welfare invariant in the 
face of price changes, you will be giving them too much additional money. So long as this 
bias is approximately time-invariant, it affects the central bank’s inflation target itself, not day-
to-day stabilisation policy. Since measured zero is not zero, price stability is achieved when 
reported inflation is positive by the amount of the bias. 
Measures of consumer price inflation that are rooted in the theory of the cost of living index 
may be biased measures for a variety of reasons.
10 Loosely speaking, bias arises because of 
the way the raw data that go into the index are collected, how they are weighted together and 
combined into a single index, or how the statistical agency gathering the data tries to deal 
with improvements and deteriorations in the quality of the goods being priced.  
A typical consumer price index is intended to measure the inflation experience of a 
hypothetical average or representative consumer. To construct the index, a statistical agency 
must determine what it is this hypothetical consumer spends their money on – that is, what 
the consumer buys.
11 
The first bias, substitution bias, arises because the assumptions about what individuals buy 
do not reflect actual expenditure patterns as consumers tend to shift away from goods that 
become relatively more expensive. The ability of consumers to substitute between food and 
clothing, or food and entertainment, in response to relative price changes is somewhat 
limited. However, the scope for substitution between bread and chicken, or between movies 
and video rentals, is usually a lot greater.  
The biases due to the various forms of substitution induced by changes in relative prices are 
well understood and in principle easy to deal with by using alternative weighting schemes, 
such as chain-weighted indices, and by increasing the frequency with which the weights are 
changed. However, the problems posed by changes in the quality of the goods and services 
included in the consumer price index and the arrival of new goods in the consumer 
marketplace pose the greatest challenges for statisticians in accurately measuring the cost of 
living. Quality bias arises when statisticians fail to take into account improvements in the 
quality of a good or service included in the consumer price index. Finally, new goods bias 
arises when statisticians fail to recognise the introduction of new goods or services on which 
consumers spend a significant fraction of their income.  
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How big are these biases? In advanced countries, they are probably on the order of 1 to 2 
percentage points, at most. But in EMEs, where data collection is more difficult, they can be 
large. 
While computing the size of measurement bias in a particular index may pose a significant 
practical challenge, it is clear what to do once you have the number. The same cannot be 
said for administered prices. How should a central bank treat inflation arising from changes in 
administered prices? In Brazil, for example, there are two sorts of prices that are not set by 
markets: regulated prices, such as those for telephone use and electricity, which are set 
based on rules; and administered prices, including those for mass transportation and health 
insurance, which are determined by national, regional or local governments. Most of these 
prices relate to services, with a public or private monopoly or oligopoly. Some of these prices 
move in predictable ways as they are based on things like past inflation, the exchange rate, 
or the international oil price, so they are known in advance. But in general, changes in 
regulated and administered prices are difficult to integrate into a macroeconomic model 
designed to produce an aggregate inflation forecast. Nevertheless, policymakers are 
obligated to try to control inflation in the economy as a whole, so they need to react to 
movements – both expected and unexpected – in these prices.  
Wages, productivity and structural inflation 
Original models of macroeconomic fluctuations – the first Keynesian models – were built on 
the premise that wages were not flexible, so labour markets did not clear. The idea was 
simple: employment was demand-determined. Since demand fell during a cyclical downturn, 
the result would be unemployment. But in the 1970s this logic fell out of favour in academic 
circles. Observed wages had little relationship to the marginal product of labour on a day-by-
day or even month-by-month basis. Instead, wages were conceived of as instalment 
payments in longer-term contracts, with the vast majority of workers working harder when 
there was more work to do and sitting around the rest of the time. There was a spot market 
for marginal workers, and their wage moved to clear that market. 
Starting in the late 1970s, macroeconomists began to build models based on price rigidity. 
There was a labour market in the background (with an implicitly flexible wage determined by 
the equilibrium of supply and demand) but the baseline models were composed of a set of 
monopolistically competitive firms that faced costs of adjusting their prices. It took a while, 
but over the last decade researchers have been looking at price data to see how sticky 
prices really are. The answer is: not very! And the prices that are fixed for extended periods 
tend to be the ones in service-based industries. In fact, the higher labour’s share in costs, the 
less flexible prices tend to be.
12 
Maybe academics should not have given up on wages. Central bankers clearly did not. And 
the reason for this is their importance in the inflation process. Wage growth equals 
productivity growth plus inflation.
13 In fact, growth in real wages that is in line with labour 
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productivity growth (usually measured as average output per hour paid) is widely seen as a 
necessary precondition for macroeconomic stability. In EMEs, with their concern for exports, 
a close relationship between real wage growth and labour productivity growth helps preserve 
external competitiveness while limiting inflationary pressures and the risk of a wage-price 
spiral developing. 
A wage-price spiral typically occurs when employees and others seek wage increases to 
keep pace with rising prices. The increased wages force employers’ costs up. These 
increased costs may then be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Higher 
consumer prices feed into future wages, and the spiral is on its way.
14  
During the first half of 2008 there were widespread concerns in both EMEs and many 
advanced economies that the run-up in food and oil prices would set up just such an adverse 
inflation dynamic. In China in the spring of 2008, for example, authorities in several provinces 
felt obligated to raise minimum wages by double digit amounts to relieve the pressure higher 
consumer prices were putting on real household income. This raised concerns that overall 
inflation could accelerate as a result and hurt China’s external competitiveness.  
All of this strongly suggests that measures of labour costs at the aggregate level could serve 
as a useful indicator of economy-wide inflation pressures. Unfortunately, until recently a lack 
of data has undermined attempts at such an analysis in most EMEs. As a result, few EME 
central banks have mentioned the labour-cost inflation linkage in the past. But the adoption 
of inflation targeting frameworks by many emerging market central banks has provided an 
incentive to compile better labour market data and has enabled central banks to use 
productivity and unit labour costs more widely in their inflation forecasts.
15 Even so, some 
countries employ proxy measures for wages: interestingly, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the 
Hungarian central bank) uses service price inflation to forecast wage dynamics. And in 
countries where productivity data do exist, interpretation can be tricky. For example, in Korea 
the difference between real wage growth and productivity growth has declined over time. 
Attempts to use wage data in inflation analysis are always going to be challenging for several 
reasons. First, there are problems with timing and quality that do not appear in the case of 
price information. Wage data often come with a long delay – two to three months in Israel 
and Poland, for example. And because many series are based on national accounts 
information, they are also subject to revisions (as they are in the Czech Republic). In other 
cases, data are simply unreliable as national statisticians are unable to ensure sample 
consistency, so the numbers are not adjusted for changes in composition.  
Nevertheless, in those countries with high levels of collective bargaining, wage agreements 
provide substantial information. The Reserve Bank of India pays attention to wage bargaining 
and contracts, particularly in the public sector. The extent to which these are forward-looking 
can provide policymakers with information about inflation expectations. And, in inflation 
targeting countries, the central bank’s inflation target can become an anchor if it is built into 
wage agreements.  
Finally, any attempt to employ official wage data in the policy process can be hampered by 
the existence of an informal sector. A number of Latin American EMEs report informal 
sectors that account for 50% or more of their economies. In such cases, movements in 
measured wages can be very misleading. For example, if a country raises its statutory 
minimum wage, this will be reported as wage inflation. But if the result is to drive more 
workers into the lower-wage informal sector, the result could be a net reduction in the 
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properly measured average wage. There are, of course, forces pushing in the opposite 
direction as governments push to shift the informal sector into the formal one. Unfortunately, 
there is very little information on the implications of employment dynamics between formal 
and informal sectors for overall wage setting in EMEs.
16 
Before moving on, I would like to note that it is often useful to supplement the analysis based 
on economy-wide measures of wage and productivity growth with more disaggregated 
measures derived from two-sector models.
17 One of the most widely used two-sector models 
is that of differential productivity growth in tradable and non-tradable industries. This kind of 
model has some quite interesting implications for the economies with rapid productivity 
growth in tradable industries, including that: (1) the rate of wage increase tends to adjust to 
the “room” for wage increase in the tradable sector, as defined by the sum of the 
(exogenous) increase in world market prices for tradables and the (exogenous) rate of 
productivity increase in that sector; and (2) as faster productivity growth in tradable industries 
is a normal part of economic development, not all inflation in such economies is necessarily 
undesirable or avoidable. If labour and capital markets are unencumbered, there is not much 
that monetary policy can do to control this source of inflation. 
What this means is that as EMEs catch up to the productivity level of their advanced 
neighbours and trading partners, they can expect to have higher inflation. Such real 
convergence creates structural inflation differences that pose significant medium-term 
challenges. Does this mean that EME monetary authorities would be well served by focusing 
on inflation in tradable/non-tradable goods (as they do, for instance, in Colombia)?
18 
Inflation expectations and monetary policy 
The third topic discussed at the February 2009 meeting of Deputy Governors of emerging 
market economies was inflation expectations and their relationship to monetary policy. In 
considering this very general topic, a series of questions arise: 
1.  How do central banks measure and use inflation expectations? 
2.  What is the relationship between inflation expectations and the costs of disinflation? 
3.  Are monetary policy frameworks effective in anchoring inflation expectations? 
Inflation expectations measurements and their use 
There are two basic sources of inflation expectations: surveys and financial markets.
19 
Moreover, the first group encompasses surveys of households and businesses, professional 
forecasters and financial market participants. All of these have drawbacks. For example, 
household and business surveys are costly, which can influence coverage, frequency and 
quality. The survey population can be unrepresentative, with more informed than uninformed 
people in the sample. There is a clear tendency for household surveys to be biased, with 
inflation expectations systematically overestimating actual inflation experience. (In fact, 
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households systematically perceive inflation to be higher than it is.) Obviously, policy 
decisions should not be based on biased expectations.
20 
Turning to professional forecasters and financial market participants, the data here also have 
shortcomings. Prime among them is concern about incentives. Two issues arise. First, there 
is the cost of revising expectations. However, given that these are professionals, that 
problem is likely to be small. Unfortunately, the second problem is significant. Professional 
forecasters are paid for their forecasts, and their pay depends not just on accuracy but on 
recognition. The only way to be recognised is to be right when everyone else is wrong; 
however, that is impossible if everyone’s forecast is the same. This creates an incentive to 
try to distinguish forecasts from each other that has nothing to do with accuracy.  
Finally, there are financial market expectations. In many developed financial markets the 
existence of inflation-linked financial securities provides a market-based measure of inflation 
expectation as well as attitudes toward inflation risk. The difference in the rate of return of an 
inflation-linked bond and a nominal rate (the “break-even rate”) would offer a market-based 
measure of inflation expectations. An important issue is how to disentangle inflation 
expectations from other factors that may be embedded in the break-even rate. Break-even 
rates can be decomposed into at least three components: (i) expected  inflation  during  the 
remaining maturity of the bonds; (ii) inflation risk premia; and (iii) liquidity premia. Technical 
factors specific to each market may also play a role.  
Sometimes, the expected inflation component is extracted by using expectations from 
professional forecasts. In the case of the United States such (longer-run) expectations have 
been relatively stable, and it appears that most of the recent volatility in the break-even rate 
is attributable largely to liquidity premia (a higher liquidity premium would increase the yield 
on real bonds relative to nominal bonds and recently a flight to safety lowered the nominal 
rate for US Treasury securities). Thus, the break-even rate appears to give a relatively noisy 
signal of inflation expectations at this time.  
Some EMEs (eg Chile or Israel) have been able to develop inflation-linked government (or 
central bank) bond markets, but in most cases such markets do not exist. 
Turning to actual experience, central banks vary in their use of surveys. Hungary and the 
Philippines survey both households and businesses. Korea surveys only households; and 
Thailand only businesses. Turkey surveys both businesses and the financial sector, while 
Brazil and Israel survey the financial sector alone. Finally, Chile surveys forecasters. There is 
wide variation in the frequency of the surveys; the nature of the questions, both the index and 
the horizon; the statistics reported (means, medians, etc); and the nature of publication – the 
Central Bank of Brazil publishes individual forecasters’ responses on its public website.  
A number of central banks report using a variety of financial market indicators (break-even 
inflation and swap market rates). The preferred financial market indicator reflects availability 
and market conditions. Brazil, Chile and Israel use inflation-linked bonds to compute break-
even inflation rates. While Israel reports that this is useful, other authorities appear less 
sanguine about the guidance they receive from break-even measures, as the market for 
indexed bonds is not always very liquid. There are alternatives. For example, in Thailand, 
where there are no inflation-linked bonds, the central bank uses the implied forward yield 
curve; the risk premium is small and the long-term rate is stable so inflation expectations can 
be extracted, at least during periods when markets are functioning normally. 
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Expectations and the costs of disinflation  
Inflation persistence is a key factor in the costs of disinflation. There are two possible 
explanations for the presence of inflation persistence: (1) backward-looking, or not fully 
rational expectations (possibly a result of explicit indexation); and (2) private agents having 
limited information about central bank objectives. 
International experience is extremely diverse on this issue. In some countries, for example 
Brazil, Chile, the Philippines and Thailand, inflation expectations are quite persistent. And the 
extent to which forecasters are forward-looking clearly varies. In the Philippines and 
Thailand, expectations also appear to be backward-looking, based on past data. By contrast, 
in the Czech Republic, household expectations are backward-looking because people 
believe that the past is certain while the future is uncertain, while on the other hand, financial 
analysts are forward-looking. 
While backward-looking expectations are a problem when the central bank is attempting to 
disinflate, they are not where there is low and stable inflation around the target. In Turkey, 
financial sector agents’ expectations move much more closely with actual inflation, while real 
sector expectations are stickier. Nevertheless, in some countries expectations and costs of 
disinflation appear to be closely related. For example, in Colombia minimum wages and 
regulated prices are subject to indexation in spite of the adoption of inflation targeting 10 
years ago. The result is that Colombia’s disinflation process is slow. 
Anchoring expectations and the role of the monetary framework 
One of the primary rationales for inflation targeting is to anchor inflation expectations. In fact, 
many people would say that this is the point: keeping expectations of inflation low keeps 
inflation low. But is this actually the case? 
A few points are worth making in this regard:  
  In the case of developed economies using a measure of inflation expectations 
implied by bond yields, studies find that in the United States long-term inflation 
expectations react to news, while in inflation targeting Sweden and Canada they do 
not!
21  
  Evidence from the United Kingdom also supports the view that (credible) inflation 
targeting anchors expectations, as expectations responded to news prior to 1997, 
when the Bank of England became independent, but not after.
22 
  A study of developed economies by Federal Reserve Board economists finds that 
lagged inflation is significantly correlated with expectations of future inflation in non-
IT countries but not in inflation targeters.
23 
As for the EMEs, questionnaire responses and papers contributed to an earlier Deputy 
Governors meeting
24 provide the following insights into the behaviour of inflation 
expectations: a number of EME central banks find that inflation expectations have been 
better anchored in this decade and continue to highlight this success; a stronger reaction of 
financial markets to central bank policy announcements has been recorded; and there has 
been an improvement in central banks’ ability to reduce the size of policy adjustments.  
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Unsustainable fiscal policy can break the link between inflation expectations and the inflation 
target. If households, businesses and financial market participants can come to believe that, 
because of fiscal policy, it will become too costly to maintain an inflation target, then fiscal 
policy will dominate monetary policy. The story is a familiar one: with a large public debt, 
tighter monetary policy can lead to higher sovereign risk premia (by increasing the probability 
of default on debt), depreciation pressures and higher inflation. In the past, both Brazil and 
Turkey have been described in this way. And, notwithstanding significant gains in fiscal 
consolidation, public debt to GDP ratios remain high in a number of countries, suggesting the 
possibility that policies may be unsustainable. Are current fiscal policies designed to address 
only current challenges, sowing the seeds of even bigger future problems? After all, central 
banks cannot achieve their low inflation objectives on their own. They need fiscal 
cooperation. 
Conclusion 
Price measurement is at the heart of macroeconomic stabilisation policy. Without adequate 
measures of inflation, monetary policymakers would have no final long-term objective at 
which to aim. And without a clear understanding of inflation dynamics, central bankers have 
nothing to guide their short-term policy actions. Building appropriate price indices for 
monetary policy, as well as models of their evolution that allow for control, is a significant 
challenge faced around the world. Today, emerging market economies are making 
substantial progress in meeting that challenge. 
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